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Abstract 
The economic and institutional structure required for successful adoption and implementation of 
Inflation Targeting (IT) framework is often lacking in Emerging economies. In this paper, we 
evaluate these structures for the economy of Pakistan both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Although our comprehensive assessment identifies non-realization of many core requirements but 
as literature and real time experience pointed out that IT can be a framework for emerging 
economies even in the absence of these conditions, we go further by investigating that if State Bank 
of Pakistan (SBP) decides to adopt IT, does there exist a stable and significant relationship between 
policy rate (monetary tool) and inflation measure (objective)? This bivariate relationship is 
important to be analyzed given the important role of interest rate in mitigating the deviations 
between actual and target inflation while working within the IT framework. To illustrate this 
relationship, we use Granger Causality test and our estimates fail to find any significant link 
between interest rate and inflation. On the basis of overall findings, this study suggests that 
Pakistan, due to the absence of most fundamental requirements of IT, is perhaps not ready for 
Inflation Targeting yet.   
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I: Introduction 
Over the last two decades, a monetary policy framework that has gained recognition all over the 
world is the Inflation Targeting Framework (ITF); and there is a growing literature regarding its 
applicability, its effects on economic performance and its superiority to other frameworks 
(Exchange rate targeting, monetary aggregate targeting). Inflation Targeting has been defined as 
a framework for monetary policy in which central banks commit to low and stable inflation as 
their long term objective, make public announcement of quantitative targets and hold 
themselves accountable for these targets (Bernanke et al., 1999). In literature, three rationales 
can be attributed to the widespread adoption of IT. First, the only macro-economic variable that 
monetary policy is capable of affecting in the long run is inflation rate. Second, there is almost 
consensus about the negative impacts of even modest inflation rate on economic efficiency and 
growth. Although, the link between inflation and overall economic performance is ambiguous in 
theory as inflation is determined with the interaction of many factors, but significant 
econometric studies are available that associate high inflation with low productivity and with 
low rate of growth (Fischer, 1993; Judson and Orphanides, 1996; Sarel, 1996; Bruno and 
Easterly, 1998; and Hess and Morris, 1996). And the third reason for the popularity of inflation 
targeting is that it works as “nominal anchor” by imposing several constraints on CBs.  
Successful adoption and implementation of inflation targeting strongly requires the existence of 
some “economic” and “institutional” pre-requisites in the candidate country but when it comes 
to emerging and developing economies, these pre-requisites often do not exist (Masson et al., 
1997). These pre-requisites can be described as; independence of central bank, transparency of 
information, fiscal discipline, floating exchange rate, moderate or low debt level, sufficient 
foreign reserves, demand side dominance and the strength of financial system (Masson et al., 
1997; Bernanke et al., 1999; Blejer et al., 2000; Mishkin, 2000; Taylor, 2000; and Siklos, 2002). 
In this study, we evaluate these pre-requisites both qualitatively and quantitatively to assess the 
applicability of Inflation Targeting for Pakistan. In addition, we examine that if State Bank of 
Pakistan (SBP) wants to adopt Inflation Targeting as its main monetary policy framework, does 
there exist a stable and significant relationship between interest rate proxied by policy rate (PR 
hereafter) which is the principal monetary policy tool used to affect inflation in Inflation 
Targeting countries, and inflation (proxied by consumer price index; CPI)? To illustrate this 
bivariate relationship, we use Granger – Causality test through which we intent to investigate the 
authenticity of causality running from policy rate to inflation (policy rate Granger-cause 
inflation). This gives us an idea whether the policy rate is able to affect inflation, its behavior and 
its dynamics to the same extent as it is required by Inflation Targeting framework to mitigate the 
deviations between actual and target inflation in short run. 
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Our assessment of pre-requisites reveals that Pakistan either does not meet most of the pre-
conditions of Inflation Targeting or just partially meet them. In addition, as far as the 
relationship of interest rate and inflation measure is concerned, our results indicate that PR does 
not Granger-cause inflation which means that interest rate does not seem to affect inflation 
directly and thus cannot be used to forecast inflation dynamics.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow: Section II provides an overview of monetary 
policy developments in Pakistan and the main objectives of its monetary policy. Section III 
discusses the pre-requisites for the adoption of Inflation Targeting framework; and broadly 
assesses whether Pakistan meets those requirements or not. Section IV develops an econometric 
framework to check the viability of Inflation targeting framework in Pakistan by estimating the 
relationships among inflation measure, short term interest rate and some other policy anchors; 
and Section V concludes.  
 
II: Monetary Policy Developments in Pakistan 
In the late 1980s, the monetary authorities in Pakistan started working on ‘comprehensive 
financial sector reforms’ with the help of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. 
Many steps have been taken during these reforms and two of them were the turning point for 
monetary sectors. 
1. First one was the independence of the Central Bank of Pakistan that took place in 1994 
when SBP was assigned the sole responsibility of making and conducting Monetary 
Policy.  
2. Second important step was the adoption of market-based or indirect instruments of 
monetary policy. Before these market-based instruments and tools, SBP used to rely on 
administered monetary policy regime governed by ad hoc changes in: reserve ratio, 
directed credit and regulated interest rate policies.  
From the onslaught of financial sector reforms in Pakistan during 1980s and the initiation of the 
independence of SBP in 1993, SBP started to follow “Monetary Aggregate Targeting” in 1994, 
assuming stable demand for money function in Pakistan. The ultimate goals of monetary policy 
under the framework of Monetary Aggregate Targeting was inflation reduction (maintain price 
stability) and output growth with Broad Money (M2) as intermediate target and base money or 
reserve money as operational target. Moreover, with the adoption of market-based instruments 
more attention was paid to the management of short term interest rate and SBP adopted 3-day 
SBP discount rate as major policy instrument to signal easing or tightening of monetary policy.  
Since 1994, SBP is pursuing “Monetary Aggregate Targeting” in which SBP announces and 
pursues monetary growth target (intermediate target) consistent with the government’s real 
GDP growth and inflation rate targets (ultimate targets and objectives). Although SBP has the 
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ultimate objective of high GDP growth and low inflation which is also confirmed by the objective 
function developed by Malik (2007) but it also indicates that the policy has been focused on 
several other factors like foreign interest rate, exchange rate and trade deficit.  
Monetary policy in Pakistan is characterized by “Discretion and Judgment” rather than “Model or 
Rule based” which brings the problem of time inconsistency1. It is worth noting that though SBP 
is following monetary aggregate targeting but there is no information available about underlying 
macro-economic model being used by it. SBP only announces the short term targets for the 
period of one year and there are no model based projections given for the medium term. Geraats 
(2005a) argues that short term targets are indeed the forecasts rather than the targets in a real 
sense because of the fact that monetary policy affects inflation with lags greater than one year.   
 
III: Infrastructure for the Adoption of Inflation Targeting in Pakistan 
Discretion and Judgment based actions that currently characterize the monetary regime of 
Pakistan as well, were the dilemma that led to the popularity of Inflation Targeting Framework 
in the rest of the world. IT is not a pure “rule”; rather it is a framework for policy within which 
“constrained discretion” can be exercised. This discretion is constrained by the announcement 
and commitment of a central bank to pursue low stable inflation as its ultimate objective.  
Beginning with the New Zealand, there are many developed and emerging economies that have 
adopted IT and the experience of these economies with IT has been generally positive. However, 
it is often argued that economic structures in emerging economies are incapable of supporting 
an IT regime in the short and medium run. Ample research has been conducted to identify 
whether IT could be an appropriate framework for these economies despite the absence of its 
pre-requisite, and the answer is positive (Masson et al., 1998).  
 
III.a Pre-Requisites 
There are varying pre-requisites for IT defined in the literature. In table 1, we provide a 
consensus based list of those pre-requisites (Siklos, 2002; Bernanke et al, 1999; Blejer et al, 
2000; Masson et al, 1997; Taylor, 2000; and Mishkin, 2000).  
  
                                                           
1
 See literature: Kydland and Prescott (1977) ; Barro and Gordon (1983) 
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Table 1 
Pre-requisite Rationale 
Independence of 
Central Bank 
Independence is important to make the policy credible and to make 
responsibilities and accountability clear.  
Transparency of 
information 
The central bank ought to communicate clearly and frequently with 
government, markets and the public in order to earn credibility. This 
condition is often referred to as the transparency objective. 
Fiscal Discipline Fiscal policy must be compatible with Monetary policy and the conduct of 
MP should not be constrained by fiscal deficit. This requires that fiscal 
deficits should be reduced by using revenue-based measures rather than 
relying on the CB for domestic borrowing (Masson et al., 1997). High fiscal 
deficits also lead to high inflationary pressures in the economy.  
Floating 
Exchange Rate 
In the long run, inflation targeting works best with flexible exchange rate 
regime, but short term intervention may be permissible during transition 
period.  
Moderate or low 
debt level 
In the case of high foreign debt level, there exists a trade-off between the 
priorities of inherited conflicting objectives of monetary and fiscal policies.  
Sufficient Foreign 
Reserves 
The buffer created by foreign reserves should be adequate for the successful 
implementation of IT.  
Demand side 
dominance 
Inflation Targeting works in the case of demand side dominance, supply side 
dominance makes IT unsuitable for a country. 
Financial system 
strength 
The strength of financial system is crucial as the decisions of CB flows to the 
economy through financial markets.  
 
III.b Does Pakistan meet pre-requisites of IT? 
In the following paragraphs, we evaluate the economy of Pakistan against the pre-requisites 
listed above. 
III.b.1 Independence of Central Bank 
The empirical justification for Central Bank (CB) autonomy is based on studies demonstrating 
that there is a robust negative correlation between CB’s autonomy and inflation. Different 
indices have been developed to proxy central bank’s autonomy and to establish its relationship 
with macroeconomic variables; and these indices can be categorized as de jure and de facto. 
Although, earlier studies mostly focused on developed countries, but two studies that provide a 
more global approach of the issue and are widely cited, are those of Cukierman (1992) and 
Cukierman and Webb (1995). These studies are based on de facto measures of CB’s autonomy 
and provide better results in case of developing countries.  
State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956 with subsequent amendments, describes the current functions 
and responsibilities of SBP as the central bank of Pakistan.  Two amendments are worth noting 
with reference to SBP’s autonomy.  
• A bill was passed in February 1994 that established the formal and legal autonomy of 
SBP by making monetary policy its sole responsibility. 
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• An amendment was approved in January 1997 that further enhanced the independence 
of SBP by giving it the right to determine and enforce limits on government borrowing 
from it.  
However, later on, an Ordinance of 2000 compromised the effective autonomy of SBP in two 
ways. First, by authorizing the federal government to direct SBP to set up funds for special 
purposes (credit schemes); and second by delegating authority to appoint the Governor of SBP 
to the President that made SBP vulnerable to political pressures (Wasim and Musleh-ud Din, 
2008). 
Although, the ordinance of 2000 deteriorated the SBP’s independence, however, to counter that, 
in 2005, the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act 2005 was passed that requires 
Government to reduce its revenue deficit to zero by 30th June 2008 and maintain it thereafter, 
and concurrently reduce public debt to sixty percent of GDP by 2013 and below that limit 
thereafter. However there were serious flaws in its implementation pointed out by Shamshad 
Akhtar, the governor of SBP who said that “the government had borrowed 204 billion rupees 
between January and March and 283.9 billion from April to June (2008). In the last two days alone, 
it borrowed 55 billion rupees, she added”.  
A recent IMF working paper of 2007 calculates autonomy of the central banks of 163 countries 
as by the end of 2003. Comparative results with reference to Pakistan are reported in table 2 
below. 
Table 2 
 Political Autonomy Economic Autonomy Overall Autonomy 
Pakistan 0.38 0.63 0.50 
India 0.25 0.75 0.50 
Average for EMEs 0.56 0.75 0.65 
Average for Advanced Economies 0.70 0.81 0.75 
Source: Arnone et al (2007) 
IMF calculation and recent facts mentioned above suggest that SBP is much less politically 
independent when compared to the emerging and developed economies not only overall but 
individually in Political and in Economic domain as well.  
 
III.b.2 Transparency of Information 
Transparency is another important pre-requisite of IT and a by-product of central bank‘s 
independence. With the passage of time, the importance of transparency has been increased due 
to its impact on expectations and uncertainty about economic variables. Faust and Svensson 
(2001), Barro-Gordon (1983), Walsh (1999), Geraats (2002), Sorensen (1991), all of them using 
different economic indicators show that more information is better as it reduces uncertainty 
about economic variables. The transparency of central bank is vital and important not only for 
the IT framework but for every monetary policy regime (Chortareas et al., 2002).      
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Dincer and Eichengreen (2006) have measured the transparency of 100 central banks including 
Pakistan. They followed the definition of transparency proposed by Eijffinger and Geraats 
(2002) and by taking a large number of central banks as done by Fry et al. (2000). They are of 
the view that “central banks in the advanced countries are more transparent than central banks in 
emerging markets (defined as middle-income countries with significant links to international 
financial markets), which in turn are more transparent than central banks in developing 
countries”. The transparency of SBP as measured by this approach is provided in table 3 below:  
Table 3 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Pakistan 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 
Source: Dincer and Eichengreen (2006) 
Following Eijffinger and Geraats (2002), Wasim and Musleh-ud Din (2008) have analyzed the 
monetary policy transparency in Pakistan. According to them, SBP scored 4.5 out of 15(highest) 
in transparency as depicted in figure 1 below. 
Figure 1 
 
Source: Wasim and Musleh-ud Din (2008) 
State Bank of Pakistan pursues multiple objectives with the dual mandate of price stability and 
output growth. SBP announces short term targets but it does not announce medium term 
objectives. The economic data on GDP and inflation is available on quarterly basis, but there is 
no information which macro-economic model or rule is being used by SBP for forecasting and 
establishing short term targets, in addition to this, no comprehensive forecast is made for future. 
Any policy change in instrument / tool is announced at the day of implementation, but no 
information / explanation is provided related to the change in operating target or the effect of 
that change on intermediate target.  There is no information on the institutional settings for 
interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities, which is the prime reason of poor 
coordination between government and SBP. SBP provides information on forecasting errors but 
it does not explain how forecasting had been made and what contributes to these forecasting 
errors. SBP also does not provide information on the exact contribution of the Monetary Policy 
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in achieving the announced objectives rather it conduct some superficial and vague policy 
evaluation.  
These facts show that the transparency level of SBP is quite low, which is the major hindrance 
for the implementation of inflation targeting framework. Unless central bank is transparent, its 
credibility will be low and it cannot anchor public expectations as a result of which the policy 
actions cannot be transmitted to the economy in a desired manner. 
 
III.b.3 Fiscal Discipline 
An important pre-requisite in the successful adoption of IT is the absence of fiscal deficit and the 
coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities. According to Masson et al. (1997), fiscal 
dominance is one of the major obstacles in the implementation of Inflation Targeting.  
Fiscal deficits are highly inflationary through their impact on money supply. There is a ferocious 
cycle between fiscal deficit and inflation. High deficit is financed through increase in money 
supply, high money supply causes high inflation, to curb this inflation, interest rates are raised, 
which not only crowd out investment, but also raise deficit further by raising debt payments; the 
inflation also indirectly impact fiscal deficit by reducing the real value of tax collection; and like 
this the cycle continues (Jha, 2004; Engen and Hubbard, 2004).       
The economy of Pakistan is characterized by high fiscal deficits. The budget deficit has widened 
to 8.3 percent of GDP in the 12 months to June 30. That’s the highest since 1991 when it reached 
8.8 percent of GDP, according to finance ministry website2. The monetary policy cannot be 
effective to limit inflation in the existence of expansionary fiscal policy and high government 
borrowings from the banking sector. Almost 60 percent of the budget deficit was financed by 
commercial banks and SBP for the period of July 1 – Jan 29, FY083 (SBP MPS of Jan-June, 2008).  
As stated by Agha and Khan (2006), inflation is affected by government’s bank borrowings for 
budgetary support and fiscal deficit. “Our inflation is reaching alarming levels mainly due to 
borrowing,” said SBP Governor Shamshad Akhtar while announcing the monetary policy for the 
fiscal year 2008 – 2009.  
In this situation, even if SBP adopts price stability as its primary objective, the achievement of 
this objective would be dependent on fiscal discipline in the economy. SBP does not have the 
option of refraining itself to finance the high fiscal deficit because if it decides to do so, the 
outcome would still be inflationary as the public debt/GDP ratio could turn unsustainable in the 
medium term. 
 
 
                                                           
2
 http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/30-Jul-2008/Govt-
borrowings-alarm-State-Bank 
3
 http://www.sbp.org.pk/m_policy/MPS-JAN-JUNE-FY08-EN.pdf 
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Figure 2 
 
Figure 2 shows clearly the higher level of fiscal deficit after 1990. The same pattern can also be 
observed in domestic and foreign borrowings. Although, there seems to be a systematic switch 
between domestic and foreign borrowings which can be due to the reason that probably, 
government used these two borrowings to redeem each other alternatively. This situation is 
more likely keeping in view the fact that the main source of deficit financing in Pakistan is 
borrowings either from the banking sector or from the foreign government.  
Pakistan has always been exposed to high fiscal deficits throughout its history and is the major 
hindrance in the proper working of monetary policy. The absence of this pre-requisite is 
considered sufficient enough to reject the adoption of IT by emerging economies, and favors the 
exchange rate targeting in these countries.  
 
III.b.4 Floating Exchange Rate 
Another important pre-requisite of Inflation Targeting is floating exchange rate regime. Pakistan 
has been following fixed peg exchange rate regime up to early 1980s, however, after that, the 
monetary authorities decided to abandon it in order to initiate an important transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. As a result of this policy shift the exchange rate regime has been 
evolved to “managed float” till 2000 and “free floating” thereafter(Khan and Qayyum, 2007). 
Though, the Pakistan has been claiming to follow floating exchange rate regime, however, an IMF 
report (2006), regarding de facto exchange rate regimes of different countries ranks Pakistan as 
one of those countries having differently claimed (de jure) and actual (de facto) exchange rate 
policies. According to the report, in actuality, Pakistan falls under the category of “other 
conventional fixed peg arrangement”4.    
                                                           
4
 http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/index.asp 
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This inconsistency between de jure and de facto actions of monetary authorities and their 
reluctance to let the exchange rate float freely can be explained by “Fear-of-Floating” literature 
by (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) which says that:   
• Exchange rate vulnerability can severely affect the balance sheet of an economy through 
banking, corporate or even public sectors if the economy has high liabilities 
denominated in foreign currency. 
• Exchange rate vulnerability may be passed to domestic price levels by its pass-through 
mechanism that can be highly inflationary.  
According to Hussain (2006), apparent evidence of potential balance-sheet-type effects seems to 
suggest a case for a peg of rupee. However, there is little evidence of significantly higher pass-
through of exchange rate into domestic inflation in Pakistan than in other countries. Hyder and 
Shah (2004) come to the same point that exchange rate pass-through effect on domestic 
inflation in Pakistan is quite weak.  
 
III.b.5 Sufficient Foreign Reserves 
On the one hand the foreign reserves of Pakistan are decreasing due to high trade deficit and 
debt servicing, and on the other hand the devaluation of Pakistani rupee is also increasing the 
burden of foreign borrowing and trade deficit.  Figure 3 shows the forex reserve held by SBP and 
Banks in the form of SDR and USD.  
Figure 3 
 
 
Figure 3 above clearly indicates that forex reserves of Pakistan have always been low until 2000 
after which a sharp increase can easily be observed. The probable reason for this drastic 
increase is said to be the event of 9/11 in USA, which triggered the high foreign remittances 
from all over the world to Pakistan. This was also confirmed by SBP while emphasizing 
additionally on the contribution and rise in foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment 
rose more than 69 percent to $2.1 billion in the first seven months of the 2006/07 fiscal year 
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(July-June), led by inflows into the financial, communications, and energy sectors. However, 
Pakistan's foreign reserves, which hit a record high of $16.5 billion in October, 2007, have been 
depleted by high payments for oil imports and fell to $9.57 billion in the week ended on August 
16, 2008 (Reuters, August 22, 2008).  
The history of foreign reserves in Pakistan is not marked by high levels in the past, although, 
there was a constant increase during 2000 to 2007, but the even higher level of uncertainty 
since 2007 suggests that Pakistan probably would not be able to maintain the sufficiently higher 
level of reserves required for the successful adoption of IT framework.  
 
III.b.6 Demand side Dominance 
An implicit assumption behind ITF is that monetary policy should respond primarily to demand 
side shocks as the recurrence of supply shocks limits the role of monetary policy in containing 
inflation. Pakistan is a small open economy which is highly dependent on imports and the supply 
shocks such as increase in oil and commodity prices within and abroad, which makes inflation in 
Pakistan dependent on monetary as well as non-monetary factors.  
Chaudhry and Choudhary (2006) suggest that “Pakistan’s economy is operating at a very 
horizontal portion of the supply curve and the major cause of inflation is an increase in import 
prices, not in the mismanagement of monetary policies. They indicate that the growth rate of 
import prices is the most important determinant of inflation in Pakistan, both in the short run and 
long run, which is followed by growth rate of output”.  
 
III.b.7 Financial System Strength 
The last but not the least precondition for the adoption of IT is the strength of financial system. A 
healthy financial system not only minimizes potential conflicts that may arise between economic 
stability objective and financial stability objective but also guarantees effective and smooth 
transmission of monetary policy. Financial stability is vital for the eventual success of any 
monetary policy as in the case of fragile financial system, central bank may become overly 
constraint whenever there is a need to increase interest rate to tighten monetary policy as this 
increase may result into contraction of the balance sheet of financial institutions. In addition to 
this, more developed or sophisticated the financial system of a country is, the more a central 
bank will place emphasis on inflation control and macroeconomic outlook.  
According to IMF World Economic Outlook of October, 2005, the strength of financial system in 
Pakistan is noteworthy. The strength has been measured using different indicators such as 
measures of financial market depth (private-bond-issuance-to-GDP, ratios of stock-market-
capitalization-to-GDP, and stock market turnover, or the maximum maturity of actively-traded 
nominal bonds, and the extent of banks’ foreign currency open positions) and risk weighted 
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capital adequacy ratio. Table 4 shows that Pakistan performs better than its peers and scored 
0.5 which is equal to the average score of industrial countries.  
Table 4 
 Financial System Health5 
Average of Industrial Economies 0.5 
Average of Emerging Economies 0.4 
Pakistan 0.5 
Source: Zaidi (2006) 
An important factor behind this favorable result is the comprehensive financial sector reforms of 
late 1980s resulting in a healthier and more competitive banking system (Zaidi, 2006). 
 
c. A Royal flush or A Seven-Deuce Offsuit? 
In the following table 5 we present the summarize results of above mentioned analysis along 
with the status of each pre-requisites based of course on the available information and the 
judgments which could be different from other researchers.  
Table 5 
Pre – Requisite Status Comment 
Independence of 
SBP 
Partial SBP has de jure independence but when it comes to 
operationalizing monetary policy actions it doesn’t have 
much political independence.  
Transparency of 
Information 
Partial SBP is partially transparent, as it has started to provide some 
information on economic state but it does not provide 
information on ex ante or proactive basis that is required for 
pre-commitment to inflation target.  
Fiscal Discipline No This condition is not met entirely. There is no coordination 
between fiscal and monetary authorities and fiscal gap has 
always been negative in the history of Pakistan. 
Floating 
exchange rate 
No Although, SBP claims that it has adopted floating exchange 
rate regime but de facto regime of Pakistan is pegged 
exchange rate as indicated by IMF.  
Moderate or low 
Debt level 
No The government borrowings are on increasing trend in 
Pakistan and this problem has become more severe since the 
last decade. 
Sufficient foreign 
reserves 
No (at least 
presently) 
The reserves condition has always been dissatisfactory in 
Pakistan except for the period 2000-2007. The present data 
also indicates downward trend in reserves.  
Demand side 
dominance 
No Pakistan’s economy is also characterized by supply side 
shocks and heavily dependent on imports and oil prices.  
Financial system 
strength 
Yes Pakistan’s economy is bank-based as opposed to market-
based. Although, the reforms of 1990s have strengthen the 
banking sector but still there is a need for more maturity and 
depth, as the sector boom could be the result of a credit 
bubble.  
 
                                                           
5
 IMF staff calculations, source Zaidi (2006) 
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All indicators and pre-requisites lead to the reservations about Inflation Targeting framework in 
Pakistan. IT requires that central banks should refrain from using any other nominal anchor but 
all the indicators in Pakistan suggest that inflation targeting cannot be the sole objective of SBP. 
SBP cannot ignore the issue of fiscal deficit, high government borrowing, current situation of 
falling reserves, large swings in exchange rate, depreciating rupee and the supply side shocks 
due to high increase in consumer and oil prices. All these issues require SBP’s prime attention 
thus hampering its commitment towards the single nominal anchor of inflation and 
metaphorically putting it in the situation of having a worst possible hand in Poker of “Seven-
Deuce Offsuit”.  
 
IV: Econometric Assessment  
An implicit condition to pursue IT is that there should be a stable and significant relationship 
between the measure of inflation to be controlled and the short term interest rate. Short term 
interest rate is the major tool used by central banks for the transmission of monetary policy, and 
low / stable inflation is their final objective. Interest rate can influence inflation through cost of 
capital channel, exchange rate channel, and wealth effect channel; but here we are interested in 
only in the causality of short term interest rate on inflation measure, rather than in a particular 
transmission channel because this causality is indeed important in the subsequent success of IT. 
 
IV.a Data, Methodology and Results 
The essence of inflation targeting framework is that interest rate should be used to correct the 
deviation of actual inflation from the target. By using Granger – Causality test we intent to 
investigate that interest rate Granger – cause inflation measure in Pakistan or not. Equation 1 
below expresses the general form of this causality: 
     	   …  	  	   …  	      Equation 1 
Since the Granger causality test is relevant only when the variables involved are either 
stationary or non-stationary but co-integrated (Granger 1988a); therefore the methodology of 
the empirical work in this paper is as follows: 
• Tests for Stationarity  
• Tests for Co-Integration: Engle Granger Approach  
• Tests for Co-Integration: Johansen and Juselius Approach 
• Granger – Causality Test 
We used quarterly data from 1976 – 2007 from the database of International Financial Statistics 
(IFS). The reason to drop the data before this time period was the separation of East Pakistan 
and other major political disturbances in 1971 that had caused major shift in the economy and 
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financial structure of Pakistan, and due to which the economy had been remained turbulent upto 
1975. The variables used in this analysis are as follows: 
• INF= Inflation based on Consumer Price index of 12 major cities (Base = 2000) 
• PR = Policy Rate (Discount rate used by SBP as a primary monetary tool)  
• XRG = Exchange rate growth (Appreciation/Depreciation of PKR/USD, period average) 
• M1G = Growth rate of Narrow money 
The major advantage of using quarterly data is its additional relevance and usability in the 
context of less developed countries as observed by Ryan and Milne (1994). We calculated 
quarterly growth rates of CPI-12 Major Cities, Exchange rate(PKR/USD) and M1 (Narrow 
Money) on Year-on-Year basis by taking fourth lagged difference of their natural logarithms. In 
other words we calculated the annual percentage change in concerned variable with its value 
from the corresponding quarter in previous year.  
This percentage change will serve as INF, XRG and M1G respectively where INF is the principal 
variable of interest and PR, XRG and M1G will act as the anchors of inflation targeting, exchange 
rate targeting, and monetary aggregate targeting respectively. The relationship of each anchor 
with the ultimate objective of low inflation has been estimated in the following paragraph.  
 
IV.b Test for Stationarity 
Phillips-Perron test; a test for non-stationarity has been employed on all variables. It can be seen 
from table 6 below that we can reject the null of unit root at 1 percent significance only in the 
case of M1 growth rate whereas all other variables are found having unit root i.e. they are non-
stationary. However the first differences of all variables are stationary at 5 percent or low level 
of significance.  
Table 6 
Variables PP – Statistics Variables PP – Statistics 
INF -2.763065* ∆INF -9.153139*** 
PR -1.745847 ∆PR -9.935687*** 
XRG -2.569599 ∆XRG -9.462074*** 
M1G -5.429246*** ∆MIG -25.87351*** 
Note:***,**,* respectively indicates rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
 
IV.c Test for Co-Integration 
The real purpose of any econometric model is to develop a relationship between economic 
variables but that relationship could be spurious in the presence of non-stationarity of the 
variables. PP test above indicates that all the variables are stationary at first difference except 
M1G. In this scenario, a meaningful relationship can only be established between the variables if 
they are co-integrated (Granger, 1986; Engle and Granger, 1987).  
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To identify the co-integration relationship between INF and all other variables i.e: PR, XRG and 
M1G, we used Engle – Granger approach at first. The co-integration will be checked by running a 
regression of variables and then by conducting the stationarity test on its residuals. If the 
residuals are found stationary, it indicates that the variables are co-integrated and there exists a 
long run relationship. Estimated bivariate regressions are represented by equation 2,3 and 4  
where dependent variable INF is same and independent variable is one of the three anchors (PR, 
XRG, M1G) each representing three different monetary policy regimes. We also introduced a 
multivariate regression (equation 5) containing all three anchors simultaneously.     
 
            Equation 2 
            Equation 3 
     !1       Equation 4 
       "  #!1    Equation 5 
 
The results of three bivariate regressions are summarized in table 7 below revealing the 
following observations:  
Table 7 
Variables  Co-efficient Standard  Error Test –Statistic Prob.  
1. $%& and '( 
c 4.211773*** 1.022513 4.119040 0.0001 
PR 0.289890*** 0.089293 3.246511 0.0015 
PP Test on Residuals of Equation 2 -2.891277** 0.0493 
2. $%&and *(+ 
c 7.609482*** 0.367919 20.68250 0.0000 
XRG -0.031907 0.042754 -0.746293 0.4569 
PP Test on Residuals of Equation 3 -2.750284* 0.0686 
3. $%& and ,-+ 
c 7.071375*** 0.749468 9.435187 0.0000 
M1G 0.025416 0.050565 0.502637 0.6161 
PP Test on Residuals of Equation 4 -2.778932* 0.0643 
Note:***,**,* respectively indicates rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
• INF and PR are co-integrated of level one because we can reject the null hypothesis of unit 
root for the residuals of equation 2 at less than 5 percent level of significance. The coefficient 
of PR in co-integration vector is though significant but showing positive sign which is 
contrary to theoretical and historical expectations, thus suggesting that PR does not have an 
ability to affect INF in the same way as monetary authorities intend. 
• PP test on the residuals of equation 3 shows that though we cannot reject the existence of co-
integration between INF and XRG at 10% level of significance. However the negative sign of 
XRG in equation 3 indicates that positive growth (depreciation of PKR against USD) helps in 
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reducing inflation which is as surprisingly contrary to the expectations as we have already 
observed in the case of relationship between INF and PR. 
• There is a possibility that INF and M1G are also co-integrated as the null of unit root is 
rejected at 10% significance level; but again the coefficient of M1G, despite being positive, is 
insignificant thus showing its inability to play any meaningful role in containing inflation in 
long run. 
Table 8 
Variables Co-efficient Standard Error Test -Statistic Prob. (P-val.) 
C 1.707199 1.527858 1.117381 0.2661 
PR 0.453631*** 0.102026 4.446238 0.0000 
XRG -0.098318** 0.045022 -2.183799 0.0309 
M1G 0.091582* 0.052683 1.738356 0.0847 
Tests for Non Stationarity on Residuals of Equation 5 
Phillips-Perron Test -3.137852**  0.0264 
Note:***,**,* respectively indicates rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
The results of multivariate regression estimated as equation 5, presented in table 8 above, 
demonstrate that there is an evidence of significant long run co-integration relationship among 
the variables as the residuals are stationary at almost 2% level of significance according to PP 
test. All co-efficients are significant at 10 percent or low, but the positive sign of PR as opposed 
to negative expected sign still questions its importance while formulating policy decisions 
regarding inflation.  
 
IV.d Test for Cointegration – Johansen and Juselius Approach 
Due to the shortcomings of EG approach when more than one cointegration relationship exists 
we further extended our analysis to the use of VAR based cointegration test following the 
framework and methodology developed by Johansen and Juselius (1991, 1995). 
Consider a VAR of order p 
  /	  0  /1	1  2  3 Equation 6 
Where  is a k-vector of non-stationary I(1) variables,   is a d vector of deterministic variables 
and 3 is a vector of innovations. This VAR could be rewritten as  
∆  ∏ 	  ∑ Γ7∆	7
1	
78  2  3   Equation 7 
Where Π  ∑ /7
1	
78 : ,          Γ7   : ∑ /<
1
<87=  
We used two different specifications of Johansen’s test, one is with intercept and the second is 
with both intercept and trend terms in cointegrating equations (results not reported here), 
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simultaneously allowing for linear deterministic trend in data for both specifications. The 
difference in specifications does not change our results. 
Trace statistics and maximum eigenvalue statistics calculated according to equation 8 and 9 are 
reported in table 9: 
>?@A|CD  :E ∑ log @1 : I7D
J
78?=     Equation 8  
>KLM@A|A  1D  :E log@1 : I?=D  >?@A|CD : >?@A  1|CD  Equation 9 
 
Table 9 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Trace Statistic Max-Eigen Statistic 
NOPQRS Prob.** NTQU Prob.** 
None *  0.269374  82.50202  0.0000  37.97625  0.0016 
At most 1 *  0.171091  44.52576  0.0005  22.70503  0.0298 
At most 2 *  0.139826  21.82073  0.0049  18.22506  0.0112 
At most 3  0.029279  3.595677  0.0579  3.595677  0.0579 
 
Table 9 indicates that according to both trace and max statistics the null of no cointegration 
relationship is rejected and we can proceed up to the acceptance of two cointegration 
relationships at 5 percent level of significance. The normalized cointegrating coefficients 
provided by Johansen’s test are reported in table 10 below. 
Table 10 
Variables Co-efficient Standard Error 
PR 
0.427082 0.29257 
XRG 
0.581697*** 0.14816 
M1G 
0.991806*** 0.19059 
 
The above results are consistent with EG approach as far as the sign of PR is concerned thus 
conforming us about the long run “positive” relationship between policy rate and inflation. This 
conclusion further reinforces us to believe that policy rate cannot be used as a suitable anchor to 
target inflation in long run which is explicitly required by the inflation targeting framework. 
Positive signs and significant values of coefficients of XRG and M1G support not only the present 
practice of monetary aggregate targeting by SBP but indicate that the exchange rate targeting 
could be another viable solution to stabilize inflation as believed by many researchers.  
 
IV.e Granger – Causality Test 
Inflation targeting framework requires that whenever there is a deviation of inflation from its 
target, we must use interest rate to correct it. Interest rate can influence inflation and its 
behavior only if it has the ability to Granger cause inflation. The results of Granger – Causality 
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tests between INF and PR are provided in table 11. The maximum lag length is six. This is 
because the frequency of data is quarterly and six lags allow us to look sufficiently for the impact 
of policy anchor on Inflation.  
Table 11 
Lags 
PR and INF MIG and INF XRG and INF 
 VWXY ZW[  
\]YX  
 VWXY ZW[ 
\]YX   
!  VWXY ZW[ 
\]YX  
 VWXY ZW[ 
\]YX !   
  VWXY ZW[  
\]YX  
 VWXY ZW[ 
\]YX    
1 0.88797 10.2621*** 3.55603* 0.34824 1.83792 4.06033** 
2 1.48705 3.78914** 2.69644* 0.39464 1.79348 1.97912 
3 0.79772 2.91086** 1.84064 0.55833 0.99323 1.42825 
4 0.91607 1.92303 1.72427 0.45566 0.97093 1.23869 
5 1.28657 1.41905 3.04773** 0.95606 1.61360 1.08389 
6 0.93968 1.24934 2.48110** 0.84166 1.28282 0.88718 
Note:***,**,* respectively indicates rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
 
The results force us to infer that interest rate and exchange rate are not very much effective in 
influencing the behavior of inflation and instead PR and XRG are being caused by INF. However 
we can say that M1G is able to affect INF up to 6 lags which is also somewhat consistent with the 
findings of Khalid (2005) who found that M1 granger causes INF at 3rd lag. 
 
As PR does not seem to be affecting inflation directly even up to six lags we analyze further what 
PR is capable of influencing. We check the direction of causality of PR to M1G and PR to XRG and 
the results are shown in table 12 clearly indicate that interest rate has an influence on narrow 
money thus showing its importance in an overall monetary policy by influencing inflation 
indirectly through money supply (Table 11). 
Table 12 
 
Lags 
PR and MIG PR and XRG 
!  VWXY ZW[ 
\]YX  
 VWXY ZW[ 
\]YX !  
  VWXY ZW[ 
\]YX  
 VWXY ZW[ 
\]YX   
1 0.09594 5.07934** 0.50034 1.17508 
2 0.33712 2.92512* 0.51479 4.18419** 
3 0.50003 3.85172** 0.94424 4.11643*** 
4 0.96001 5.49555*** 1.79100 2.96494** 
5 3.02597** 3.35722*** 3.55624*** 1.00611 
6 3.17425*** 3.02668*** 3.09913*** 0.62778 
Note:***,**,* respectively indicates rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
 
 We would also like to highlight two 
about the relationship between
These results indicate that interest rate not only affect exchange rate directly but also indirectly 
through the channel of money supply and inflation.
clearly with the help of following figure
Observed Monetary Policy Transmission Channel in Pakistan
 
 
 
  
Although, there may be some limitation
line with Lucas (2001), who is of the view:
evidence, interest rates play no role whatsoever”.
This rule seems to be applying in Pakistan; and if Pakistan adopts Inflation Targeting then 
inflation would not be sensitive to the movements in the interes
interpret these results in the manner that
interest rate as an instrument to influence 
inflation”. 
  
interesting results that we get from Granger Causality test 
 INF and XRG (table 11) and between PR and XRG (table 12)
 All these relationships can be explained 
 4: 
Figure 4 
s in our analysis, but we can interpret these results in 
 “In the theory of inflation, consistent with much of the 
 
t rate directly
 “Granger Causality test provides 
money supply, that subsequently 
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. We can also 
support for using 
Granger Cause 
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V: Conclusion 
Success in Poker significantly depends on the ranking of the hand (combination of cards) a 
participant starts with. Odds in favor of success or a reasonable performance are very low with a 
seven-deuce offsuit which is unanimously considered as the worst possible hand in this game. 
We fear that metaphorically Pakistan is also having the seven-deuce offsuit when it applies on 
the decision of opting or not the inflation targeting framework. We qualitatively assess the 
applicability of Inflation Targeting framework in Pakistan by evaluating it on the basis of 
necessary economic and institutional structure required and our analysis shows that most of the 
pre-conditions of Inflation Targeting are weak or non-existent and thus suggests that Inflation 
cannot be the sole objective of State Bank of Pakistan. SBP cannot ignore the issues of fiscal 
deficit; high government borrowing; current situation of falling reserves; large swings in 
exchange rate; depreciating rupee and the supply side shocks. We also quantitatively assess the 
significance and role of short term interest rate in the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
and we came to this conclusion that short term interest rate has no role in affecting inflation 
directly; however it can affect inflation through the money supply channel. The absence of direct 
link between interest rate and inflation is contrary to the essence of IT framework which 
requires that interest rate should be the sole anchor in targeting inflation. These findings compel 
us to believe that neither Pakistan is ready to adopt inflation targeting, due to the absence of 
pre-conditions required; nor it can control inflation directly through interest rate measure, 
which is the basic premise of inflation targeting framework, even if it decides to adopt it. 
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